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FOREWORD
PRIVACY LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
A TRIBUTE TO RICHARD C. TURKINGTON
GREGORY P. MAGARIAN*

A

T least since Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren's seminal 1890
article "The Right to Privacy,"' the idea of privacy has sparked some
of the most significant and contentious debates in American law. Over the
past three decades, Richard Turkington focused his formidable intellect
on enriching those debates. Dick's untimely passing in 2004 deprived
those of us who knew and worked with him of a treasured friend and a
brilliant colleague. The broader legal profession lost a visionary. Probably
more than any other scholar of his generation, Dick was responsible for
expanding and deepening our understanding of the essential, sometimes
elusive, idea of privacy in the legal domain. His omnivorous mind reached
across disciplines and doctrines to generate unprecedented insights about
why human beings care so much about privacy, in what circumstances legal relationships and privacy concerns affect one another, and how courts
and policymakers should think about the interplay of privacy interests and
competing societal concerns. In light of Dick's towering influence in the
privacy field, his colleagues at the Villanova University School of Law decided that the school could honor his memory most appropriately by convening a stellar group of scholars to explore how the law of privacy will
develop in the decades to come.
Among the primary challenges of privacy as a subject of legal scholarship are measuring its reach and discerning the connections it makes
among seemingly disparate subjects. In their pathbreaking case book Privacy Law,2 Dick and his coauthor, Symposium contributor Anita Allen, answered those challenges by articulating a sophisticated taxonomy of
privacy doctrine. Privacy, they explained, "has informational, physical,
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
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proprietary and decisional meanings." 3 From that platform, they proceeded through an exhaustive survey of privacy doctrines in diverse areas
of private and public law. In an imperfect echo of their approach, this
Symposium consists of three panels, each focused on a doctrinal area in
which privacy issues loom especially large: law and medicine; constitutional law, with particular emphasis on the decisional autonomy of individuals and families; and information technology.
Another defining challenge of privacy scholarship is the need to grapple with hard cases. Should the interest of gay and lesbian couples in marriage overcome the political community's desire to close the boundaries of
"traditional" marriage? Does the danger of spreading AIDS justify revealing the HIV-positive status of a person who is concealing his condition
while remaining sexually active? Does the danger of terrorism justify the
government's compilation of data on our telephone calls? Each of the
Symposium participants foregrounds the difficulty of the issues privacy
raises in his or her field in order to deepen our understanding of those
issues.
The medical sphere, perhaps more than any other area of routine
human activity, is fraught with privacy concerns, as patients must place
their bodily integrity in the hands of caregivers and institutions that both
need to gather sensitive personal information and stand in a strong position to abuse it. The three articles from the Symposium's medical privacy
panel emphasize different practical problems policymakers face in balancing the complementary but often contradictory interests in using medical
information to benefit society and preserving patient privacy.
Ellen Wright Clayton examines medical researchers' creation of biobanks-databases that combine patient data with DNA studies-which
help them understand genetic factors in disease. 4 Technology has enabled this potentially beneficial practice, but Dr. Clayton notes its potential
downside in privacy terms. Describing the regulatory landscape, she explains that neither the "Common Rule" that requires informed consent
from human research subjects nor the authorization requirements of federal medical privacy regulations constrain the use of clinical data in biobanks. Nonetheless, and despite biobanks' capacity to serve the public
good, many institutions voluntarily seek informed consent and impose
oversight on uses of patient data, a phenomenon Dr. Clayton attributes
primarily to concerns about adverse public perception.
Barry Furrow emphasizes the value of a practice that usually prompts
suspicion from privacy advocates: data mining.5 He explains that, particularly in the hospital setting, collection and analysis of information about
treatment decisions and results provides a distinctly useful basis for uncov3. Id. at 25.
4. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Patients and Biobanks, 51 VILL. L. REv. 793 (2006).
5. See Barry R. Furrow, Data Mining and SubstandardMedical Practice:The Difference Between Privacy, Secrets and Hidden Defects, 51 ViLL. L. REv. 803 (2006).
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ering hidden information about ineffective caregivers and for generating
ideas to improve care. Data mining, for example, can reveal when hospitals have hired or retained personnel whose patients suffer complications
at unusual rates. Of course, the information in question implicates patient
privacy interests of the first order. Professor Furrow, however, emphasizes
that institutions often deploy privacy concerns to shield their failings, resulting in the protection of secrets and undetected patterns of conduct
whose revelation would help patients. Constrained by safeguards that take
patient privacy considerations into account, the compilation and study of
hospitals' data on treatment of patients can directly advance patients' critical interest in receiving safe and effective medical care.
Radhika Rao refocuses our attention on the dangers of technologically enabled medical data collection, but with a fresh and challenging
take on how information can threaten privacy interests. 6 Ordinarily, she
reminds us, scholars see tension between privacy and equality values. In
the context of genetic data collection, however, the two interests converge.
Employers and other interested parties have increasingly sought to use
ever-more sophisticated means of genetic testing to identify medical risks
in individuals and to use the genetic information as a basis for treating
people differently. This practice, Professor Rao contends, undermines
both individual privacy and the societal interest in equal treatment of individuals. Accordingly, she proposes that we construct and maintain a "veil
of genetic ignorance" to protect everyone from the adverse consequences
that might befall any of us based on discovery of our genetic characteristics. Her proposal rests on the premise that genetic traits are both too
complex to be reliable and too intrinsic to be legitimate as grounds for
differential treatment of individuals.
The sense of privacy that embodies the human right to make autonomous decisions has dominated and complicated the past four decades' developments in constitutional rights. Advocates and activists have drawn
familiar battle lines: political liberals and believers in constitutional evolution favor expansions in constitutional privacy protection, while political
and jurisprudential conservatives find few if any privacy guarantees in the
Constitution. Looking to the future, however, all three participants in the
Symposium's constitutional privacy panel identify ways in which the changing shape and growing complexity of constitutional privacy issues are causing those familiar lines to blur or cross.
Anita Allen considers the constitutional and social implications of legal rules that mandate a species of privacy: sexual modesty. 7 Although our
constitutional norms increasingly favor personal autonomy, we accept legal rules that restrict or prohibit public nudity, lewd public behavior, and
6. See Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic Ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy to Ensure Equality, 51 VILL. L. REv. 827 (2006).
7. See Anita L. Allen, Disrobed: The Constitution of Modesty, 51 VILL. L. REv. 841
(2006).
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sexually explicit public performances. Closely examining Supreme Court
opinions that have upheld nude dancing restrictions, Professor Allen
reveals the Court's justifications as a combination of abject legal moralism
and thinly substantiated assertions about harmful secondary effects. While
acknowledging the societal force of justifications for mandatory sexual
modesty, Professor Allen cites women's consent to recent broadcasts of a
mastectomy and a birth as illustrating the value of opportunities for sexual
immodesty. She finds value in sexual modesty mandates that curb degrading displays of sexuality, but she cautions against modesty rules that effectively limit women's social roles and personal autonomy.
David Meyer confronts the age-old distinction between acts and omissions in the cutting-edge context of debates about whether constitutional
principles protect gays' and lesbians' right to marry.8 Constitutional protections of family privacy traditionally entail government noninterference
with family decisions. Most commentators, therefore, presume that constitutional arguments for formal state recognition of gay marriage or the
right to adopt a child must overcome that negative rights paradigm. In
contrast, Professor Meyer inverts the paradigm. He begins with the proposition that the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas9 protects
all family relationships, including nontraditional ones, from destructive
state interference. He then builds a persuasive case that forbidding marriage or adoption does not amount to mere nonrecognition but in fact
constitutes destructive interference with intimate family decisions. By this
account, courts may invoke the Constitution to protect gay marriage and
adoption-potentially subject, of course, to the countervailing force of sufficiently weighty government interests-without incongruously imposing
affirmative obligations on the state.
Mark Rahdert undertakes a major assessment of the Supreme Court's
privacy jurisprudence during the tenure of the late Chief Justice William
Rehnquist.10 The privacy doctrine that the generally conservative Rehnquist Court inherited from its predecessors exposed divisions in conservative priorities. On one hand, conservatives broadly mistrusted the
jurisprudential innovations of Griswold v. Connecticut1 and especially Roe v.

Wade, 12 and the Rehnquist Court's most conservative Justices welcomed
opportunities to attack the underpinnings of those decisions. On the
other hand, both social and small government conservatives sympathized
with some privacy protections, particularly of family autonomy. Professor
Rahdert situates Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Court's other recent departure, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, at the center of this conservative
8. See David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right to Public Recognition of Family Relationships? The Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51 VILL. L. REv. 891 (2006).

9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
10. See Mark C. Rahdert, In Search of a Conservative Vision of ConstitutionalPrivacy: Two Case Studies from the Rehnquist Court, 51 VIL. L. REv. 859 (2006).

11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tension over privacy issues. Examining both Justices' contributions to privacy doctrine, he critiques the Rehnquist Court's failure to achieve a principled conservative account of constitutional privacy, and he suggests ways
in which the new Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts and with the addition ofJustice Samuel Alito, might extend and refine
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's and Justice O'Connor's contributions to privacy
law.
Profound and rapid developments in information technology during
the Internet era have accelerated longstanding concerns about the threats
that public and private institutions pose to personal privacy when they employ technology to gather information about individuals. Both of the Symposium's articles on information technology counsel that technological
complexity and privacy concerns compel a thorough, pragmatic assessment of the interests at stake in deployment of information systems.
Gaia Bernstein casts a backward glance at the recent development of
commercial information collection over the Internet with an eye toward
socially desirable assessment of privacy considerations in future technological innovations.1 3 Noting the frequent tension between calls for unimpeded development of promising technologies and regulatory protection
of technology interests, she redirects the debate toward a pragmatic examination of when "social shaping" to protect privacy interests has a chance
to be effective. She examines the development to date of data collection
in Internet commerce and explains how several elements of the Internet's
architecture have combined to entrench "commercial non-privacy norms"
to a degree that renders future privacy protection efforts unlikely to succeed. Professor Bernstein posits this experience as an important illustration of the importance of timing, where technological features of
information systems limit windows of opportunity for privacy protection
efforts. She concludes that decisionmakers interested in protecting privacy in new online environments should identify privacy concerns early
and move proactively to incorporate privacy concerns into initial design
decisions.
Peter Swire addresses the calls heard since the 2001 terrorist attacks
for greater sharing of information about terrorist threats among nations,
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and other entities charged
with safeguarding national security. 4 Acknowledging the forceful impetus behind these renewed calls for information sharing, he proposes a set
of due diligence inquiries for policymakers to apply in assessing information sharing proposals. What is the likelihood that the proposed sharing
of information will aid enemies in undermining security? Will the proposal actually advance security, and will it do so in a cost-effective manner? Is
13. See Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection,51 VILL. L. REv. 921 (2006).
14. See Peter P. Swire, Privacy and InformationSharing in the War on Terrorism, 51
VILL. L. REV. 951 (2006).
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the proposed program merely cosmetic? Does the proposal imprudently
alter longstanding practices? Does it take account of past abuses of power
and incorporate checks to avert repetition of those abuses? Is it discriminatory or unfair? Does it unwittingly exacerbate security concerns? How
would the proposal affect the interests of allies and other stakeholders?
Would it seriously undermine privacy interests in particular? Would it
likely give rise to bad publicity that would undermine the policy? Rather
than wielding these questions to undermine specific policy proposals, Professor Swire offers them as a mechanism for conducting effective policy
debates and making wise decisions.
A striking common element in all of the Symposium contributions is
their acknowledgment of the difficult choices that privacy issues place
before judges and policymakers. A legal landscape in which technologies,
identities, and societal priorities seem to shift and evolve on a daily basis
cannot abide platitudes about the need to be left alone, or about the necessity of sacrificing some measure of privacy in order to make society
safer or more efficient. Dick Turkington, who finally had to navigate the
harshest ambiguities of personal privacy in his brave battle against cancer,
would have especially valued these articles' insistence on looking beyond
easy answers. In the unfortunately brief time I had the privilege of knowing Dick, one of his qualities that most deeply impressed me was his ability
to balance strongly held normative commitments with an unflinching
openness to ideas that challenged and opposed his own beliefs. Dick was
the kind of intellectual that every law professor should strive to be, a genuinely creative thinker who took on a dizzying variety of issues and thought
about each one from the ground up. Scholars who want to understand
and influence the ongoing evolution of privacy law will need to emulate
the combination of enthusiasm and rigor that Dick brought to his work.
The articles in this Symposium make worthy contributions to the field he
helped define.
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